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ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953 CHAPTER IX: PRODUCTION AND COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
Document Type:
CREST
Collection:
General CIA Records
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
143
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 31, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 1, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment Size
PDF icon CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2.pdf 9.36 MB
Body:
Approved For"pease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 3rd carbon SECRET CHrIPTER IX ARMY, DOS, JCS and USAF review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2004/SECREALDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved Foreease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065*00200170001-2 CROANIZATIGNAL Chapter X: T 0 IC CLM Cr7TRAL fl MCE r1CY, 19501953 C. Contents ESTIMATIIS Page Status of CIA's Estimating Program and ?rocedure in 1950 1 Departmental Participation is of 125e 4 Production Record by 1950 8 Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity and Change, 1950 10 Tq.eactivation of Intelligence Advisory Committee, Oct. 1950 24 ratablishment of New Office of National rstinates Nov. 1950 27 Organizing and Staffing of New Estimates Office, 1950-1953 32 Initial Organization of CNE 36 Board of National Estimates, ONE 38 Estimates Staff, ONE 4it Support Staff, ONE 49 25X1A I I ONE 51 Training Programs Affecting Estimating 56 Clientele and Scope of "National* Estimates, 1950-1953 59 3roadening Definition of National Estimates 59 ProFramming and Scheduling of Estimates 67 Format Decisions and Challms 70 Clientele for Estimates 73 Geographic and Topical Coverage of Estimates 75 Summary of Progress, 1950-1953 81 Changing Needs for Supporting Documentation, 1950-1953 86 Departmental and Agency-Research Participation in Production Contributions by Departmental Intelligence Agencies Contributions by CIA Research Offices Inter-Agency Coordination of Draft Estimates 94 96 102 111 Pstimating in Relation to Operational Planning, 1950-1953 161 ?NE's Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1951-1952 164 Experimentation with "Net' Estimates, 1951-1952 175 ARMY, DOS, JCS and USAF review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2060EitRETIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X Approved Forapease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065600200170001-2 Chapter II DUCTION AN (....kitOINATIA OF INTELLIGENCE LiT.DIATE.6 Jt.atue of CIA's EstimatinkProgram and i7rocedure in 19p By August 1950, when ;general omith waa appointed as Director, CIA had had some 14 years of experience, under three successive rlrectors, with the Govermient's experiment of producing intelli- gence estimates on a cooperative, interdepartAental basis. His- torically there as probably nothing older or mcre basic in intelligence ork than the ultimate task of estimating a foreign oower's caJatAlities, weaknesses, and intentions. Only in recent years, however, had the Jovernment attempted a contizinp, organized effort at con-)rehonsive ruti'lLtin:, in which the Nation's total resources and talents, traditionally decentralized among several depart itnts and agencies, mi'ht so:7khow be relularl: brought to bear, in a single integrated and objective evaluation, on a -iven foreign policy issue or international situation. Such a concerted approach had been informally attempted durin: L'orld .ar I by the Joint Intelli,,ence Committee (JIC), which had been continued after the war, Llren though responsibility for coordinated, interdepartmental estimaldnr sasfficially assi:ned to the Director of Central Intel- ligence. The years l6-50 were eleprintal ..1tY respect to this problem and marked by a measurE of accompliah.rent with, perhaps, a larger measure of -r blems and difficulties. Responsibility to Approved For Release 20041E1GREZRDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065410200170001-2 igence /satinet". on foreign problems of mqatienal" signtticanes, in coordination, with all the deppr1rtnt,. and incise concerned dth national seturity, was vested in the eucceadvely by Presidential orier, Congressional etatute Ind Natl.onal ,nottrity Council directive.1 War these directives the established intelli- gence branches of the operating and planning departments and agencies were expectei to contribute to C/A-produced estimates, ta.i to nor Acipate in the deliberations leading to the final ostieative con- clusions. At the same time, however, the existing prerogatives of those egencies to produce independent "tepartmental" estimates were . left undi turbed; and in practice their cooperation and attention to the centrally sponsored program of coordinated estimating was not un d. ?requentiy their cooperation was only peesive. Within CLI end CrA, the new estimates program was manaced? PrOM 19116 to 1950, bv a centre' production staff which was known succesnively as the Central Reports 3taff ('7!1's), February July 1946, the C?fics! of ',Assearch and Pvaluations (ORE), July 1946 - January 10; and the Office of Reports and attsetss, February 1 bee pecially ( ?residert trunanto letter of Jan. 22, 1946 (unclaseified), ordering the establishment of the :iational Iatel.- ligence Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Croup (Cl(); (2) NIA lArective No. 1? ?eb. 19h6; (3) the 4tiona1 becurity Act of July 26, 194?, effective in 3ept. 1947, which (among other things) renamed CM the lentral intelligence Agency (A) end gave stetttory recognition to the A:Iie responsibility "to correlate and evaluate tntelligenee reletinp, to the tational security"; and (h) National oecurity Council Intellilence Directive (hAAD) Uo. 3? e- 047, which implerented thet etatute in relation to eatiftwAng responsibilitien. (Copies in IcT(1/Mt; files.) Ix 2 Approved For Release 200SIEORECTA:RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 1947 - November 1950. Pven 4it to estimates eao divided, because 0 other types of production such an pe Staff, however, attention had responsibilities for summaries, regional sur- veys, for:aP1 memoranda, and oral brief In the 174.1 of 1949, ge,0111 changes hed been made in the organisation of the Office of ,7eports and intimates. The ost important of then involved the creation Of an "stimates Production Board" consisting of the chief' of all producing divisions and of the two principal staff -under the chairmenship of the Asmistant Director. Subordinate to this ohmage was the formation of an -...AItimates Branch" within each at the producing divisions. The intention of the reorganisation was to make the estimates branches responsible for adequacy and accuracy of estimative material pre- pared by their divisions, while the ,.., timates production board was to act as a reviewing authority for all 046 estimative material. In point of fact, however, this systen was never fully utilized during the Year when it was technioally in operation, In July 1950, shortly after the beginning of hostilities in Korea, the Assistant Uri:rotor appointed a "Special Staff" to assist him in the review of current intelligenee and estimative material concerning the Korean eituation.1 This move wee undoubtedly prompted by the urgency of demands for intelligence on Korea after June 25 1 ORE Operating Procedure Order Mo. 15, July 3, 1950 (Se ret), in U/ZCl/HS files. See also two further orders: Instruction Nos 27, July 12$ and Order No. 18, Aug. 3, 1950. (Ibid.) IX 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For 4,ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 when delays in prodtctiou that had formerly been oononp1ac. had begun to seem inadmissible. The Assistant Arectoris thought seems to have ben that if he himself, assisted by a staff o intelligence estimators, avc authoritative consideration to all materiel on Korea, time otherwise spent in unresolved disagreement sight be saved. The Spacirnj Aaff" wes not, however, the equivalent of the toenail estimating group" reoommended so frequently is 15449-.1950. T'or one thing, this Staff did not supersede the "Kstimates -reduction Yoard", nor did it in are' wey disturb the general organisation of as determined in 1949. It was emphasised, on the other hand that the peas]. Staff was a temporary device, concerned only with material arising out of the Korean war. Inasmuch as virtually all material being prepared by vhE in the steamer of 1950 was related directly to the war in Korea, however, the 6pecial Staff's responsibilities, as long as it was in existence, were relatively comprehensive. It was evident that the staff could easily be transformed into a permanent estimating group such as OV, was to become. On October 26, however, the 6pecial Staff was abolished on grounds that the Noreen emergesay no longer required it .1 Airallel with the problem of internal organisation was the pro 1 of departmental participation in the CIA-sponsored estimating program. Ay 1950 had experimented with a variety of procedures and practices, including committee systems, formal correspondence, and direct contact and liaison, to the end of promoting and improving 1 0i-tic; Operating ?rooedwe 'order Mo. 21, Oct. 26, 1950. IX 4 Approved For Release 2004/04/cM1DP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065460200170001-2 departmental cooperation in tle national eatimating process, and obtaining a workable consensus on contemeersial issues. Wring the period 1516-1950, CIA had been heavily dependent on other intelligence organisations* for i11 types of- material to be used in estimates, because its Own ?enaction SOVV1Q rt had tiAlt to develop. ?hie material beceveY, came to in irt, through regol4r channels primarily designed to serve ClAts currant- intelligence needs. idcause CIE had developed since 1947 as a re- search orAnisation, it was able to arrive rot eome e(,rclAsions $rimsrily on the basis of this material as stored in its own files, supplemented through direct consultation with analysts in othdr a4enoiea. 7oma1 Aieney contributions to estimates also fiKured in the process when they were provided. Ch;Ats practice of depending on its own ri:ilearch, however, iec to critioia71 (including that to be found in the Lulls* Report) to the offset that CIA i;:nored other azencies -r the preparation of estimates rather than ltadin4.f. them in a cooperative effort. On the other hand, however, there could be little question that sttepte to take oil relevant agencies into socrount in framing final drafts of estimates. After experimenting for two years with written circulation of drafts "for concurrence, dissent, or comment", by 1950 adopted the method of discusting all pre- pared drafts with ad hoc committees made up of representatives assigned from all participating agenoies, under the chairmanship of a 1interest i representative who had ha no ;A]rt in T.:x 5 Approved For Release 200agR.FCI-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For *ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 preparing the eetimete under discussiOn. These committees?mede U p eesentially of experts?continued to meat on the estikpte at irsue until substantial rteont 1- been reached by those par- ticidating. j,fter the final _euet1ng a new draft was prepared by based on the consensus reached, circulated for final comment, and then sent officially to the I4C members themselves for concurrence or dissent. This was made particulasly necessary by virtue of the fact that Aembers of the ad hoc committees frequently were not per mitted to speak officially for their agencies. For this reason, there was, of couree, no guarantee that agreements reached at inter-agency meetings would be final. Frequently, in fact, depart- mental intelligence chiefs, or studying drafts agreeable to their subordinates, raised unforeseen objections. The *wading effort to reach agreement, however (which was frequently of lone duration), did not normally take place at the level of the departmental chiefs but rather Was handled indirectly through subordinates in the form of correspondence, telephone calls, or further meetinge of the ad hoc committees. ht the conclusion of these negotiations a satin- factor Oran would be produced or a dissent would bcoa unsvold le. CIA/OE- was nomally in a difficult position in these negotiations because it could never be sure that concessions it made to dissenting opinion on the part of one department might not render a previously agreed draft unacceptable to one of the others. In no case observed in the course of this study did the IAC itself meet to settle any of these disputes. This was, ef course, a cardinal difference between coorelnation Aires b.fore and after ',_ctober 1.950. :X 6 Approved For Release 200SKEtprr-RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065400200170001-2 For reasons as indicated above, it can be seen that no single, unvarying method could be eade to se)ply to the ;.rt4parction and coor- dination of all estimates during the 1946-1950 period. In very general terms, however, the procedure in use by October 1950 was as follows. A 4ven estimate project was scheduled in on the basil' of it request from the SSC or one of the operating departments, or on the initiative of CIA. Next, an outline of the "terms of reference', was prepared by ORS, circulated to the departmental member agencies of the PCs along with a request for contributions to the forthcoming estimate. On occasion, ad hoe committees discussed terms of reference and the allocation of contributions before they were circulated. Tech department was expected to prepare a contribution according to its special field of interest. The principal contributions came from the Z;tate, Army, Navy, and Air Force Impartmentej rarely from the other intefligence agencies in the Joint Staff, the AtOMIO Energy .;ommission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These contributions were used by On in the formation of a draft estimate. This draft was then circulated to the departmental intelligence agencies by QR. OhE then called informal meetings with JAC; 'working- level representatives" at which conflicting views were aired, further research invited if appropriate, and a consensus sought. After whatever revision wits indicated at this meeting, a final draft was formally sent to each departmental intelligence chief, for the written concurrence of that agency-, or its comment or dissent. Ix 7 Approved For Release 2004/0SECRE-rP64-00654A000200170001-2 25X1C Approved For lipase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 Finally, the finished estimatimus printed and disseminated. By August 1950, a hundred semi estimate!' hod bean qroduoed, under CIV01,!.aponsorship, aocording Veriations of this general formula that had been followed sine. 196. More recently, during. the eight months elms January 1950, some 21 such estimates had been completed.2 lost of thawdealt with Soviee Union or 1;oviet controlled areas, or trouble spots on the Soviet periphery/ /included, for map erjea of est mates early In June 1950 warning of the coming war in Aerie'. Other estimates disseminated in 1950 dealt with, areas of the Free World, In addition the following est ng projects were under way in higust 1950, at various sta,:es of completions nProspects for the Jeferise of Indochina against a eJhineae ',3ommunist invasion" (ola 5050), and *Prospects for Chinese ,;ommunist Action in Indochina during 1950P (0.,t; 50-50 Supplement); requested by tate Lipertment, !ugust 1950; completed and disseminated on September 7, 1950. Prirobable fovelopeents in astern Germany by t end of 1951" (ORI 34-50)i initiated by CIA/OR, May completed and disseminated September 29, 1950. 50; 1 The gystem described here was highly variable. in any cases, the "torms of reference* and *contribution* steps were omittad, .?ach individual estimate usually brought its own problems which required sdaAations of the system. 2 ,opies of these estimates, togetherWith working papers an correspondence, are in oirzAis files. :x 6 Approved For Release 2004/SEEEHIRD P64-00654A000200170001-2 k Approved For ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-00654.0200170001-2 ?-oatwquences to the U. S. of Communist Domination or ?le:inland :outheast Asia" (ORE 29-50); requested by tate 2.epartment, :pril 1950; completed an0 disseminated October 13, 1550, with dissents by State, Army, and 'it rune. euth ;,rricsnolities and U. S. ,ecu ' (:,r? -50 begun April 1550, requester unknown; completed onti dissemi- mteti November 17, 1950. "Ueutrality and Third-Force Tendencies in Western '4Jrope" (oF 36-50; initiated by CiA/ Ilex 1950; comAeted and disseminated Deoember 19, 1550. Ikepercussions on the Retherlends of Indonesian Independence (OAL 6-50); initiated by .CIA/O:, December 1249; completed and disseminated December 19, 1950. "Soviet Joarses of Action with kespect to Korea" . (oT.T:: 45-50); requested by NSC, July 1950; draft tient to in September 1950; and subsequently cancelled as e formal estimate. 25X1 25X1 C 25X1 C 1?01111b1e ..ttitudes of Non-Soviet Countrie toward a U. L. Decision to Initiate War against the usse (cnR 511..50); initiated by CIA/01F1 about July 1950; draft completed. about September 20, 1950; and subsequently cancelled as s formal estimate. Ix SECRET Approved For Release 2004/ _ RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 Approved For ,ase 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065440200170001-2 ?ending Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity ' Change deep :Agneral :,mith became Direetor, this CIA experiment in cooperative* interdepartmental estimating had been the subject of criticism ono controversy for almost four years. oposals for edministretive changes had come both from within and outside the agency, P.11 icularly in 1949 and 1950. Ey the sumer of 1950, some changes h d been made, while others had been shelved or were pending. In Feptember 190, the outgoing Director, on the occasion of (;L,41 annual request for fends to the President and the Bureau of the Ludget, bed singled out the manaeement of notional estimating and the need for "improving" the eetimatimg process as the number-one management problem of the 4:elley.2 Three major types of c?ntinuing adeinistrative problems appear to have been involved. First, now could the estimates be made more responsive to the needs of the Oita House, the National -;ecurity Council, the Joint Chiefs of staff, and the several operating departments and agencies conoerned with the national security? Next, how could departmental intellionoe resources and talents be better marshalled for national estimating? Finally, how could CU's own staff for estimating be bettor organised and sUffed to servo the complicated puroses for which it was intended? 1 8inroduotjon" to CIA Budget Eating' dated ept. 1* 1950* Lecret, p. 10; copy "Ustoricel Notes . . ."? 1945-52, 0/DWI3 files. IX 10 for Fiscal Year 1952, tached to CP ;'-cmptrollerts lin cIgRgi Approved For Release 2004/d 1 : -RDP64-00654A000200170001-2 25 Approved For *ease 2004/09/13 : CIA-RDP64-0065#00200170001-2 Three sets of recommend* ens calling for e national intelligence spites, Oenfraatiod, Urectors in September 1950* 'LI thr the outgoing and lanoline brAving beeneMbeitted by outside parties, on the basis e ryya and inveetleations of , CIA and departmental intelligendi agencies made in 194b, 1949, and 1950. The first was a,repert of the Hoover OommiEsionts sub"' committee or task force on natiositl...ogoltraded by Ford:UMW Eberstadt, prepared late in 194e and submitted to Congress by the Hoover 3ommission in February 1949. The second was a report of the Lulls. Larry 3roup to the National security Council, submitted in January 1949 and endorsed in principle