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14 November 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Di Meet in with President-Elect's Staff
On 13 November the DID met with Messrs. Meese, Casey,
and Allen at his EOB office. The DDCI, Bob Gates, and I
were also present.
1. The DC1 raised the question of providing the PDB. Mr. Meese
requested that we begin to supply the PDB to the President-elect at
716 Jackson Place beginning next Tuesday. Governor Reagan will be in
town through Friday and will then return to California. We should con-
tinue to supply the PDB in California beginning on Saturday. The Gov-
ernor will be in Washington for the week of 8 December and possibly for
another week in January. In this connection, we were asked about secure
communications. We told them we had secure communications to an office
in Los Angeles, but not to any area near the ranch. They told us they
wanted to keep their operations in Los Angeles; and that they would pre-
fer that any classified material or communications be handled in our
installation. We agreed to look into the questions of secure phones
both in Washington and Los Angeles. (I subsequently determined that
the Los Angeles office has a secure phone and that one is available
for installation at some location in Washington; we have not yet de-
termined a location.
2. The DC3 showed our visitor the PDB and described its function,
making the point that the PDB is done to the President's specifications
and we would hope to use the period between now and inauguration to
determine how the President-elect would like it done. The only comment
made was that a larger typeface would probably be in order.
3. They asked that in addition to the clearances that we had pro-
vided for the three of them we should clear Wineburger, Taft, Ikle, and
Deaver. We noted that while they had SI/TK clearances, they did not
yet have any of the operational clearances or the security briefings
that go with them. It was left that we would work this out as well.
4. We then discussed briefings of the President-elect. The DO
provided a proposed agenda (Attachment A). It was agreed that we would
give two briefings to Governor Reagan when he is in Washington next week.
The first one will consist of a description of the organization and
functions of the Community and CIA plus the I lin
the attachment. We subsequently determined that this will be given
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between 0945 and 1115 on Wednesday. On Thursday at the same times we
will provide a briefing on the first three topics of "II". When Governor
Reagan returns in December, we will brief on "V" and the remainder of
"II". The specific arrangements for these briefings will be made later.
The possibility was also raised that briefings on material in "IV" might
be briefed to Governor Reagan in California. It is unclear to what ex-
tent "III" will be treated in appropriate places in the substantive
briefings and to what extent it will be dealt with under "V". Mr. Casey
also raised the possibility that the DO might be asked to brief his
policy committee when it meets in Washington on Friday of next week.
5. There followed an extended discussion on particular legislation
and budgetary issues that concerned us in the immediate future. It was
agreed that the DDCI would provide a paper to Allen on our legislation
requirements. We were told that on budget issues the DDCI should deal
directly with Wineburger and it was made clear that the intelligence
support of the President-elect and his immediate staff was to be handled
through Allen and not through the transition team. The link will be
from me to Allen. More generally, Meese asked that we prepare our "wish
list" for the new Administration.
6. The Kla also suggested that they might wish to come out for
breakfast or lunch to meet with the Agency leadership. They expressed
an interest in doing it if they had time at some later date.
7. I also provided to them an FBIS memorandum on foreign reaction
to the election. (See Attachment B).
Richard Lehman
Chairman
National Intelligence Council
Attachments
A& B
Distribution:
1 - D/OCO
1 - Transition File
1 - C/NIC Chrono
2
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Categories of Possible Intelligence Briefings for President-Elect
I. Current issues with near term policy implications.
Poland
Iran-Iraq war
Iran - hostages
Afghanistan
Nicaragua - El Salvador
Middle East - Israel, Saudi Arabia
II. Longer term issues fundamental to US foreign policy.
Strategic force balance
NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance
Soviet economy
State of NATO Alliance
China - economy, leadership
III. Current operational involvements.
Afghanistan
Iran
China
IV. Current issues with policy implications in the midterm
Zimbabwe
Kampuchea
Lebanon
World energy situation
Philippines
Pakistan
Yemens
Somalia
Turkey
Morocco
25X1
V. Background on intelligence
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Special Memorandum
FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION
TO THE 1980 U.S. PRESIDEITIAL ELECTION
For Official Use Only
12 NOVEMBER 1980
FB 80-10046
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TATINTL
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FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION
TO THE 1980 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
HIGHLIGHTS
Moscow's public reaction is designed to hold out prospects for
an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations under the Reagan admin-
istration. Characterizing the election outcome as a rejection
of President Carter's policy toward the USSR, Moscow commentators
have conveyed to the Soviet domestic audience a generally
reassuring view of the probable impact of the Reagan pres.idency
an U.S. international policy.
East European reaction has paralleled Moscow's in discounting
the significance of Governor Reagan's hardline reputation and in
accenting the view that realism and self-interest will steer the
new administration toward policies compatible with constructive
East-West relations.
West European editorial opinion has divided along traditional
liberal-conservative lines while generally welcoming what is seen
as a likelihood of greater consistency in U.S. foreign policy.
A number of West German, French, and British commentators have
questioned whether Governor Reagan will be sufficiently sensitive
to the European viewpoint, discerning in some of his past public
positions on issues like SALT and the Middle East a potential
for discord between the United States and Europe.
In the Middle East, Egyptian comment has echoed President as-Sadat
in coupling praise for President Carter's contributions to the
peace process with assurances of Cairo's desire for continued
cooperation with the United States. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
several of the Gulf states have reaffirmed support for existing
ties with Washington while calling for a "more objective" U.S.
approach to the Arab-Israeli question. Israeli media, registering
guarded optimism about prospects for U.S.-Israeli relations, have
speculated that the Reagan administration may revive the dormant
"Jordanian option" in an effort to accelerate the peace process.
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Iranian Prime Minister Raja l i's assertion that "there is no
difference between Reagan and Carter" set the tone for Tehran
comment. Iranian assessments of the outlook for the hostage
issue range from claims that the election outcome will have no
impact to a suggestion that 'more time" will be needed to solve
the problem because of the impending change in administrations.
Beijing's low-keyed response to Governor Reagan's election has
reflected cautious hope that the new adminiatration will not
allow differences over the Taiwan question to impede progress in
the PRC-U.S. relationship, which the Chinese regard as strate-
gically essential. TAIPEI has welcomed the election outcome,
foreseeing an improvement in both the atmosphere and the substance
of Taiwan's relations with the United States.
' In Northeast Asia generally optimistic commeht from Japan has
been tempered by expressions of concern that divergent views on
trade and defense issues may hinder U.S.-Japanese relations as
the new administration's policies unfold. South Korea has welcomed
Governor Reagan's victory as opening the way for a possible
strengthening of the U.S.-ROK security relationship, while an
absence of Pyongyang comment squares with earlier signs in North
Korean media that the regime may be adopting a more flexible
approach toward the United States.
Southeast Asian reaction features Thai commeat welcoming perceived
prospects of a more vigorous U.S. role in sboring up the region's
security. Hanoi, preoccupied with its hostility toward Beijing,
has speculated that the Reagan administratica's Taiwan policy may
set back U.S.-PRC cooperation--a relationship Hanoi propaganda
decries as threatening Indochina's security.
African reaction has revolved around an expe:tation that the new
administration will adopt a more sympathetic attitude than its
predecessor toward the regime in Pretoria. South African commen-
tary has evinced cautious optimism on this core, while the media
of a number of the black-ruled regimes have registered apprehensive-
ness over a perceived likelihood that the nel administration will
favor South African apartheid and curtail ail to developing countries.
Latin American reaction has run the gamut fxom coolness in Panama
and defiance in Nicaragua to optimism on the part of conservative
regimes of the Southern Cone, which foresee a more sympathetic U.S.
attitude toward their internal policies and problems. Relatively
restrained Cuban commentary, largely avoidir,g the kind of invective
that marked Havana's propaganda during the campaign, has emphasized
the difference between campaign rhetoric ane what a U.S. president
does when he takes office.
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